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Abstract: This paper focuses on innovation for new product with exogenously 
determined horizontal difference from initial product which is provided either by a 
monopolist or by competitive firms. The innovator, no matter initially under 
monopoly or competition, will be unique producer of new product and need decide 
quality of new product which is correlated with investment for innovation. The paper 
through a model shows that for horizontally similar new product, competition is 
superior to monopoly to innovate. However, for typical horizontally differentiated 
product, a monopolist would choose higher quality and invest more than a 
competitive innovator does if innovation is complex, but brings about lower 
endogenous quality than the innovator initially under competition does if innovation 
is easy. Monopoly can support sales of new product with higher price of initial 
product, but also hamper product innovation to avoid erosion of initial profit. If it is 
presumed that complexity of innovation is always huge at the beginning, monopoly is 
more likely to generate innovation for horizontally different product while 
competition for similar product, respectively compared to each other. 
 
Keywords: product innovation; horizontal difference; monopoly; complexity of 
innovation 
1. Introduction 
Since Schumpeter (1950) put forward that monopoly, with monopolistic profit, is 
helpful to innovation related investment while competition holds back innovation due 
to no extra profit to invest for innovation, impact of market structure on innovation, as 
a controversial topic, absorbs lots of discussion among economists. Process 
innovation and product innovation are included in meaning of innovation. This paper 
focuses on product innovation. Arrow (1962), by his seminal work, gave an opinion 
that for process innovation a competitive firm has stronger incentive than that of a 
monopolist because monopolistic profit only the monopolist initially acquires 
diminishes incremental profit from innovation. Spulber (2012) analyses both process 
innovation and product innovation in his paper. Chen and Schwartz (2013) suggest for 
product innovation, through which new product horizontally differentiated from initial 
product is provided in market, monopoly can generate higher incentive of innovator. 
About product innovation, see also Gilbert (2006), Tirole (1988), Shaked and Sutton 
(1983), and so on.  
 Difference between two products can be abstracted into two kinds of differences 
(see Phlips and Thisse, 1982), horizontal difference and vertical difference. The 
vertical difference can be described as difference in qualities of two products (see 
Jaskold-Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980, 1982). Greenstein and Ramey (1998) 
analyze vertically differentiated product innovation and suggest monopoly has its 
advantage. Similar to work by Chen and Schwartz (2013), this paper pays attention to 
horizontal difference with model based on framework of Hotelling (1929) adapted to 
allow existence of vertical difference. Moreover, quality of new product in this paper 
is an endogenous variable partly depending on complexity of innovation and 
horizontal difference between two products is determined exogenously. This paper 
also assumes that firms are black boxes, from which paper of Bassi et al. (2015) is 
different by analyzing product positioning problem of two competing vertical 
hierarchies with Hotelling model (about product positioning problem, see also Kotler 
and Keller, 2008; Christou and Vettas, 2005; Colombo, 2012). 
   The conclusion of this paper is that competition is superior to monopoly for 
product innovation when horizontal difference is small or complexity of innovation is 
low, but inferior to monopoly when new product is sufficiently differentiated from 
initial one and innovation is tough. With respect to typical horizontally similar new 
product, results of this paper is analogous to Arrow’s work, but in regard to typical 
horizontally differentiated new product, if innovation’s complexity is comparatively 
high, this paper is consisted with Chen and Schwartz(2013). 
 Entry is not considered and the secure monopolist doesn’t need to barrier entrant 
by innovation in this paper. The innovator is either an initial monopolist or one of 
initially competitive producers. And once innovation occurs, the innovator is the 
unique provider of new product due to perfect patent protection. Gilbert and Newbery 
(1982) take entry into consideration and show that a monopolist to foil entry has 
stronger incentive to innovate than a potential entrant. Arrow suggests that an inventor 
possessing information for innovation can only sell information to an enterprise, but 
not become an entrant himself, so rent paid for information has upper limit which is 
exactly equivalent to incentive for innovation. Spulber (2012) allows an inventor 
become an entrepreneur and discusses games between inventor and incumbents. In 
this paper, new product’s position determined exogenously, i.e. the location on 
Hotelling line, if its information is possessed by an inventor, can be known by the 
innovator after paying rent and the inventor cannot entry market independently. 
 Aghion et al. (2001) come up with escape competition effect which makes a 
competitive firm have stronger motive to innovate in order to escape competition with 
“neck-and-neck” rivals and show Schumpeterian effect is almost always outweighed 
by it. Since competition has different effects on innovation, there may appear positive 
relationship (see Boone, 2000; Vives, 2008; Spulber, 2013), inverted-U relationship 
(see Aghion et al., 2005; Barbos, 2015) or U relationship (see Lee, 2005) between 
competition and innovation. And Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion et al. (2005) discuss 
“step-by-step” innovation (see also Harris and Vickers, 1987; Budd et al. 1993). This 
paper differs and focuses on one-shot and deterministic innovation like Arrow’s work. 
 Wang and Shin (2012) discuss the impact of vertical structure on innovation with 
quality of product as an endogenous variable. Analogously, this paper analyzes impact 
of horizontal structure with endogenous quality as a measurement, which could avoid 
endogenous problem caused by exogenous quality discussed below. Bhaskaran and 
Krishnan (2009) discuss contracts problem in collaborating product innovation with 
endogenous innovation but without considering pricing problem. 
Similar to terminology of utility function, the prospective incremental revenue 
resulting from future innovation with exogenous quality of new product can be called 
direct incentive (DI) for innovation and that with endogenous quality called indirect 
incentive (IDI) for innovation. What really induces firms to innovate is, however, the 
potential incremental profit from innovation called here indirect net incentive (INI) 
for innovation which is the net value after subtracting cost for innovation from IDI. 
INI is upper limit of rent an innovator would like to pay for innovation related 
information and highest reward for the inventor of the information. Conclusion of 
comparison about INI under monopoly and competition is similar to that about 
endogenous quality of new product. 
The organization of the remainder of this paper is shown as follows. Section 2 
describes the frame of model, lists the possible situations about innovation under 
monopoly and initial competition, and gives revenue functions and cost function of 
innovation. Section 3 gives methods to solve the model and main results including 
comparison between under monopolistic structure and under competitive structure of 
revenue with exogenously given quality and of endogenous quality of new product. 
Section 4 discusses reasons of some results in section 3 and gives more conclusions. 
Section 5 repeats essential conclusions, does some remarking and gives some topics 
about future work. 
2. Frame of Model 
There is a linear market like Hotelling model, where there exists initial product on one 
point and will appear potential new product on one other position determined 
exogenously. Neither of their sales coverage can reach the end of the linear market 
which is large enough. Initial product is provided either by a monopolist under 
monopoly or by many homogeneous firms under competitive structure. Presumed that 
potential new product is produced by an incumbent not entrant, the innovator, i.e. the 
monopolist or one of the initially competitive firms, may sell two products at the same 
time. Moreover, the innovator will be the unique provider of new product because of 
perfect patent protection. For simplicity, marginal cost of both products is zero and 
investment for the initial product has became sunk cost, which means the only cost in 
consideration is investment for potential new product to ensure quality’s being on 
some level. 
With respect to product innovation, decision problems encountered by a potential 
innovator can be divided into three stages. First, facing given rent for the information 
about one kind of prospective new product, a firm chooses whether to occupy the 
information and innovate. In the second stage, an innovator chooses optimal quality 
for potential new product and invests for it. In the third stage, the provider of new 
product set optimal prices for his products. The stages will be analyzed reversely. 
2.1 Revenue of an innovator 
In the third stage, what needs to be solved is pricing problem. We uses v to denote the 
utility from a unit of product a consumer gets without transportation cost which 
represents negative utility because of l, the horizontal differentiation of purchased 
product from his favorite position of product. In this model transportation cost is 
presumed as quadratic function of horizontal difference, i.e., tl2, in which t weighs 
influence of horizontal difference on consumers. If the producer is unique in the large 
linear market and sells product on price p, the output is 2k in which k, potential sales 
radius, is defined by 
t
pv
k

 . We assume that marginal cost of both products is 0. 
The optimal price set by a monopolist, which we call monopolistic price in this paper, 
is vp
3
2
 . By setting v as 3 and t as 1, we have monopolistic price being 2 and profit 
being 4, which shows that difficulty to enlarge sales makes the provider choose to set 
a higher price. In this paper qualities of initial product and new product are denoted 
respectively by v1 and v2; prices by p1 and p2. 
By setting transportation cost as quadratic function, equilibrium problem can be 
avoided, see D’Aspremont et. al (1979) and Neven (1985). Under extreme condition 
where l is tiny and verges to 0, results in this paper is approximately equivalent to that 
with no horizontal difference between two products, which shows quadratic 
transportation cost function is robust.  
Under monopolistic structure, a monopolist can sell both of products or single 
product: new or initial one. Under competitive structure, one of the incumbent firms 
can choose to provide new product or not, and whether initial product will still be 
provided by the innovator doesn’t matter since it brings about zero profit.  
Under the competitive structure, we need consider 6 kinds of situation as follows: 
(a) There is only initial product being sold in the market with no new product sold 
because of too much similarity between two products or comparatively low quality of 
new product. In this situation it is called that quality of new product is 0. 
(b) New product is sold on a monopolistic price because it’s sufficiently differentiated 
from initial product relative to given quality of two products then. 
(c) Both products are sold in the market without overlap segment or buy-none 
segment of market between their position and the marginal consumer get zero surplus. 
The marginal consumer means one consumer who is indifferent about buying initial 
product or new one. 
(d) Both products are sold in the market with an overlap segment of market between 
their position and the marginal consumer gets positive surplus. 
(e) New product exactly replaces entirely the initial product with a non-monopolistic 
price, and a higher or lower price leads to smaller revenue. 
(f) There is only new product sold in the market on a monopolistic price because of its 
high quality. 
Under monopolistic structure, taking into consideration that a monopolist will set 
a monopolistic price for new product if it is single product sold in market, (e) 
involved in competitive situations is invalid. Other 5 kinds of situations need to be 
considered under monopolistic structure. Some figures in appendix show the 
segments corresponding to different situations respectively under monopoly and 
competition, see appended drawings 3, 4, 7 and 8. 
If the market has been entirely covered by a monopolistic firm, the appearance of 
new product makes it set prices on which marginal consumer get no surplus. In 
comparison, if the market has not been covered entirely, which will be discussed in 
this paper, the monopolist, to induce more consumers, may not set such high prices 
and marginal consumer could have positive surplus sometimes. 
Situation (d), usually, is regarded as most regular situation and we analyze it at 
first. Use x to denote the location of marginal consumer and then have following 
equation: 
2
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2
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Then we have x as follow: 
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Now we have equilibrium quantities of two products as follow: 
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To avoid the radical form which makes derivative complicated, we replace the square 
roots by 
t
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
 .  
For simplicity we will eliminate t by setting it as l, because the transport cost is not 
major topic considered in this paper. Firstly we set: 
t
v
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t
v
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And then we have: 
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With given k1 and k2, firms’ revenue, in fact consumer surplus and social welfare as 
well, can be calculated by multiplying by t what their values are when t is 1. Now we 
eliminate t and have: 
2111 kup  , 
2
222 kup  ; (1) 
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Again for simplicity of numerical simulation mentioned below, we will set u1 as 3 
then. 
R above can represent, fortunately, both industrial profit and innovator’s profit 
both under monopolistic structure and under competitive structure. 
   Expressions above are proper only when following conditions are satisfied: 
(ⅰ) k1+k2≥l, (ⅱ) k1－k2≤l, (ⅲ) k2－k1≤l. 
Otherwise situation (d) fails to describe the results with given values of other 
parameters and other situations need be considered. The clue of computer program to 
solve the pricing problem is shown below. When which situation the result belongs to 
with given parameters can be known at first, it is easy to give optimum price and 
corresponding revenue. When it cannot be made sure at first, all possible situations 
need be tested and respective values of revenue need be calculated, among which the 
biggest is generally biggest revenue value. Then corresponding values of other 
variables can be calculated. 
2.2 The cost for innovation 
In the second stage, cost of innovation need be considered. There is no financial 
constraints taken into consideration and, then, a monopolistic firm and a initially 
competitive one have no difference in financing cost. Cost function depending on 
quality of new product is 
3
22
6
1
)( avvC  . Quadratic cost function is also applicable 
here but slow to convergent to optimum quality value, so in this model cubic cost 
function is used for shorter numerical matching process, which generates a rising 
incremental cost as the quality is improved. The parameter a is complexity coefficient 
of innovation and exogenously depends on technological factors. Cost function can be 
rewritten as 
3
2
3
2
6
1
)( uatuC  . By setting t as 1, we have 
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After setting u2 as 3, if only new product is sold in market, a monopolistic 
provider of new product will get zero profit when 
9
8
a . Optimum value of u2 is 
exactly 3 when 
9
4
a . If initial product is in market with u1 being 3 at the beginning 
and new product has no horizontal differentiation from initial one, a monopolist will 
replace initial product by new one when 
9
2
a (=0.2222), see appended drawing 7. 
After setting u1 as 3, profit of an initially competitive innovator from new product 
is positive when 
81
316
a (=0.3421), see figure 4 and appended drawing 8. The 
looser condition of innovation, in one aspect, shows that the competitive structure 
prevails in race of innovation for product only vertically differentiated from initial 
product. 
Complexity coefficient here, for simplicity, is independent from l. And the 
investment for initial product is sunk cost and the corresponding equipment cannot be 
updated or changed for producing new product (there is no economy of scope). 
3. Solution and main results 
3.1 Analysis about revenue under monopolistic structure 
Consider the third stage. Firstly, we solve (d) under monopolistic structure. With 
given expression (2), we have first order conditions as follow: 
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It is difficult to deduce precise solution of simultaneous equations (4) and (5). 
After setting u1 as 3, given a numerical combination of u2 and l, however, we can with 
computer calculate proper values of k1 and k2 satisfying both (4) and (5). To analyze 
characters of a monopolist’s conduction and acquire matching process with low 
algorithm complexity as well, before giving results of comparison graphically, we pay 
attention to equations above. 
When k1 is not 0, from (4) we have 
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The formula on the left side increases with k2. Provided that the variables are positive, 
the formula on the right side increases with k1. So when k1 decreases, k2 does also. 
What this means is that p2 needs to rise if a monopolist set a higher p1 and vice versa 
by symmetry. 
   Like (6), from (5) we have 
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From (6) and (7), we know that k2 is a monotone increasing function of k1 and vice 
versa, which are good attributes for designing matching process below with low 
algorithm complexity. Set k2 as 0 at first. Through (6) calculate corresponding value 
of k1 with which new value of k2 can be calculated by (7). Recycle the process until 
variations of both k1 and k2 are within error range set in advance. The convergence 
problem can be practically solved by the computer programs run for matching 
solution, which can report the number of errors that the value being tested is beyond 
right range and cannot end if there is no convergent value. So if programs give results 
with zero error reported, proper convergent values have been acquired. In each cycle, 
given that k1 is positive and smaller than square root of u2, with a value of k2, k1 can 
be calculated through to (6) by dichotomy (which shall not be substituted by Newton 
iteration which generates no convergence due to uncertainty of concave-convex 
feature of related function). By the same method, k2 can be calculated through (7). 
Variables k1, k2, R, CS, W and so on, can be depicted by the dense results of 
numerical simulation, with inputs including the value of u1 as 3 and a large number of 
numerical combinations of l and u2. 
When the results lead to k1+k2<l but two products both on monopolistic price still 
have overlapped segment of market, a monopolist would set such prices about which 
the consumer being indifferent between two products gets zero utility, see situation (c). 
So the optimum solution satisfies k1+k2=l. Since k2 can be replaced by l－k1 in 
revenue function, first order condition is given as follow: 
012622 1
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It is easy to give the optimal solution: 
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Maximum revenue then can be given by: 
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When new product can entirely replace initial product on a monopolistic price, we 
have: 
33
4 2
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u
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3.2 Analysis about revenue under initially competitive structure 
In competitive market, the price of initial product equals to marginal cost, i.e. 0. So 
we have 11 uk  . 
We firstly consider the regular situation (d). From expression (2) we have: 
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Also, the expression above is right only when conditions (ⅰ), (ⅱ) and (ⅲ) are 
satisfied. According to (9), we have first order condition 
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The formula on the left side is a concave function of k2. Variable k2 in situation (d) is 
positive and smaller than square root of u2, or means otherwise new product cannot be 
sold on a nonnegative price. After matching solution of (10) by dichotomy, we can 
easily have corresponding numerical values of other variables such as R. 
Here is some extensive analysis. The monopolistic price of new product is 
22
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2
up   and corresponding k2 is 
3
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u
k  . The partial derivative of an initially 
competitive innovator’s revenue on k2 when setting a monopolistic price is 
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The formula above is negative when value of l is large, which means, compared to a 
monopolistic price, a competitive innovator would sometimes set a higher price and 
maintain a lower k2. So the price of new product could sometimes be higher under 
competitive structure than under monopolistic structure, see figure 2. 
When new product is on a non-monopolistic price which exactly makes it replace 
initial product entirely, we have: 12 ulk   and then )(2
2
222 kukRC  . 
When the innovator sells new product on a monopolistic price and there is 
buy-none segment of market between consumers purchasing initial product and that 
purchasing new one, we have 
33
4 2
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When the innovator sells new product on such a price that marginal consumer gets 
no surplus, we have 12 ulk   and then )(2
2
222 kukRC  . 
3.3 Results of comparison with exogenous quality of new product 
Here think about only the third stage. When we set u1 as 3, incremental revenue due to 
innovation, i.e. DI for innovation, under monopolistic and competitive structure can 
be respectively computed as numerical values corresponding to different numerical 
combinations of l and u2. Two points need to be noticed here. First, realized revenue 
by potential innovator is highest among possible revenues in respective situations (for 
more detail about revenue functions, see table 1 and table 2 in appendix). Second, to 
get DI for innovation under monopoly, values of realized revenue need to be 
subtracted by initial revenue of a monopolist. By comparing values of DI for 
innovation, we get figure 1 and proposition 1. Capital letter “L” on horizontal axis and 
“U2” on vertical axis means respectively value of l and u2. We use DIM and DIC to 
denote DI for innovation respectively under monopolistic structure and competitive 
structure. 
Proposition 1: If u2>u0(l), DIC>DIM; if u2<u0(l), DIC≤DIM. Here the value of u0(l)>0 
depends on the given value of l. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of DI for product 
innovation 
E means there are equivalent values under 
monopoly and competition. M means DI is 
higher under monopoly while C means under 
competition. N means no product innovation 
occurs. (To avoid frequent fluctuation, difference 
of which value is within 0.1 is overlooked, so 
some detail of this figure is different from 
others.) 
 
Figure 2. Comparison between two 
structures about price of new product 
E means there are equivalent values under 
monopoly and competition. M means price of 
new product is higher under monopoly while C 
means under competition. N means no product 
innovation occurs. 
Results of comparison about CS and W are more likely to show competition is 
superior to monopoly, see appended drawing 1 and drawing 2. Ex-post CS under 
competition is usually bigger than or equivalent to that under monopoly except that if 
l is large and u2 is high CS under monopoly sometimes is higher even when a 
monopolist set a monopolistic price for new product, see appended drawing 5. Similar 
thing occurs about ex-post W. 
It is interesting that the price of new product under competitive structure could be 
higher than monopolistic structure if the horizontal difference between new product 
and initial product is comparatively large, see figure 2. 
Though price of new product could be higher sometimes, the competitive structure, 
compared to monopoly, with lower price of initial product usually results in higher CS. 
Even after taking into consideration the revenue of industry, monopoly often results in 
lower social welfare especially when l is small. 
In situation (f) under both monopolistic and competitive structure, revenue from 
new product no longer depends on l, which means that when new product is 
sufficiently prominent on quality or comparatively similar with initial one, horizontal 
difference exerts of no effect and only quality, then vertical difference, matters. 
3.4 Results of comparison with endogenous quality of new product 
Now think about the second stage. With cost function (3) and revenue functions 
derived before (for more detail, see table 1 and table 2 in appendix), we now focus on 
the endogenous values of u2, R, CS and other variables. It is not difficult to 
calculate—by successive comparison with computer—the optimum numerical values 
of u2 and other values of related variables corresponding to numerical combinations of 
parameters l and a, under either monopolistic or competitive structure. To get precise 
numerical value of endogenous u2, a small interval (like 0.1) between two contiguous 
elements in sequence of u2 is necessary and for shorter time to run programs we could 
set the upper limit for u2 not too high (like as 90) which also needs to be high enough 
compared with u1 as 3 when taking into consideration realistic economic environment. 
Under both structure, the endogenous quality of new product and related investment 
for it both rise as a falls. If new product is sufficiently differentiated from initial one 
or comparatively easily innovated for high quality, two kinds of structure generate 
equal u2. The result of comparison between endogenous u2 under monopoly and that 
under initial competition (denoted respectively by u2M
* and u2C
*) is depicted in figure 
3 and abstracted by proposition 2. Capital letter “A” on vertical axis means value of a. 
Proposition 2: When l<l0(≈0.27), u2C*≥u2M*. When l>l0, u2C*≥u2M* if a<a0(l); 
u2M
*≥u2C* if a>a0(l). Here the value of a0(l)>0 depends on the given value of l. 
Shown by figure 3, optimum u2 under initially competitive structure is higher than 
or equal to that under monopoly when l is small. For bigger l, when complexity of 
innovation is high, a monopolist chooses a higher u2, and a competitive firm does 
when complexity coefficient is low, compared to each other respectively. Conclusions 
above can be seen more clearly in figure 4 where l≤2.  
 
Figure 3. Comparison about endogenous 
quality of new product 
E means there are equivalent values under 
monopoly and competition. M means 
endogenous quality is higher under monopoly 
while C means under competition. N means no 
product innovation occurs. 
 
Figure 4. Comparison about endogenous 
quality of new product (details when l<2) 
Meaning of capital letters is the same with that 
in Figure 3. 
When l is small, incremental revenue from innovation under monopoly is 
independent of l as long as it belongs to situation (f). When a is 2/9, under monopoly 
endogenous value of u2 is 4.7622 which brings about exactly zero incremental profit 
for the innovator. With u2 being 4.7622, if l is small, the added revenue of a 
monopolist from innovation is smaller than a competitive firm, see figure 1. As a 
result, given l is small, with the same cost function, an initially competitive firm 
chooses a higher optimal value of u2 than that by a monopolist when a is 2/9 and a 
higher or equivalent value when a is larger. 
With given value of a, according to cost function, the investment under one kind 
of structure is larger than under the other if and only if its endogenous value of u2 is 
larger. So the result of comparison about optimum investment between two structures 
can also be shown by figure 3. An initially competitive innovator would invest no less 
resource than a monopolist on new product similar to initial one or without large 
difficulty to possess high quality. Monopoly results in larger CS only when l is large 
and a is low simultaneously, and larger W when l is large, see appended drawing 11 
and drawing 12. Consider the circumstances where l is small (smaller than 2, for 
example), competitive structure is superior to monopolistic structure with respect to 
consumer surplus and social welfare. 
3.5 IDI and INI for product innovation 
Now think about the first stage. IDI is incremental revenue from product innovation 
corresponding to endogenous quality of new product. By subtracting cost of 
innovation from IDI, we get INI for innovation respectively under monopoly and 
competition, see figure 5 and figure 6. With given l and a, a monopolist will innovate 
if the rent for related information is lower than the surface in figure 5, and a initially 
competitive firm will if the rent is below the surface in figure 6. Under competition 
when a is comparatively high, as l rises at the beginning, INI for product innovation 
falls because replacing initial product entirely, most advantageous pricing method and 
only method by which new product can exist in market then, is increasingly 
challenging because horizontal difference turns larger. 
The comparisons between monopoly and competition about IDI and INI are 
shown respectively in appended drawing 9 and drawing 10, which are both highly 
consistent with the result of comparison about optimum u2 except that when both l 
and a are small competitive structure generates larger IDI and INI for innovation than 
monopoly does despite equal value of optimum u2 because a monopolist has initial 
profit. 
Competitive firms, compared with a monopolist, have higher or at least equivalent 
bid for information of potential new product if it is similar to initial one. For 
significantly horizontally differentiated product, higher bid by a competitive firm 
appears only when the expectant complexity of innovation is low.  
 
Figure 5. INI under monopoly 
 
Figure 6. INI under competition 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Barrier effect of limited market and competition 
At first we need to look at the reason why in an entirely covered market monopolistic 
structure is often superior to competitive structure about innovation issues (Chen and 
Schwartz, 2013; Tirole, 1988). In an entirely covered market, given exogenous quality 
of products, output cannot be enlarged any more due to market limit as a barrier of 
sales, which, called here barrier effect of covered market, leaves lifting price an only 
method to increase revenue. A monopolist has stronger power to control price and 
suffer less from barrier effect than a competitive firm does in the covered market. In a 
comparatively large market, however, besides price, a producer can also increase 
revenue by enlarging output, which does not so depend on market power like setting 
high price. Specifically, in a covered market with new product and initial product 
respectively on its two ends, if under competitive structure, no matter how high is the 
quality of new product, competition from initial product could prevent innovator from 
setting a high price on which there exist consumers getting less surplus than 
purchasing initial product whose price is equal to marginal cost. This paper calls it 
location effect that the existence of initial product horizontally differentiated from 
new product holds back rise of new product’s price with its low price. So with barrier 
effect covered market is prone to higher price, and with location effect competitive 
providers of initial product diminishes potential revenue of innovator from new 
product. While in an enough large market with contestable initial product, there exists 
the monopolistic price set for new product with sufficiently high quality, which 
protects the new product from competition and leads to failure of the location 
effective from initial product. 
When initial product and new one are both sold in market, a monopolist, 
compared with an initially competitive innovator, can coordinate the prices of these 
two products to acquire larger revenue which may lead to larger added profit in spite 
of initial monopoly profit. Covered market emphasizes price which endows a 
monopolist advantages while sufficiently large market emphasizes both price and 
output which give competitive firms opportunity to maintain more reward from 
product innovation. 
Figure 2 describes the comparison about prices of new product between under 
competitive structure and under monopolistic structure respectively denoted by p2C 
and p2M. For some large l, p2C is higher than p2M. It possibly occurs due to one of three 
reasons. The first reason shown by expression (11) is that a competitive innovator in 
situation (d) sometimes would for new product set higher price than the monopolistic 
price a monopolist sets in situation (b). The second reason is competitive innovator 
choose a price in situation (c) which is higher than monopolistic price. The third is 
competitive innovator choose a price in situation (d) which sometimes is higher than 
the price a monopolist set in situation (c). Plotting figure 2 with appended drawing 3 
or drawing 4 as background could be a useful tactic to observe the results, see 
appended drawing 6. 
What could make the initially competitive innovator set a higher price for new 
product is that the competition from initial product decreases the profit of new 
product’s provider when lowering price induces more consumers but not enough to 
offset the depreciation of product. Competition then has barrier effect similar to 
limited market, which in some degree bars the increase of output and makes the 
provider of new product opt to raise its price. Particularly, in situation (c) of 
competitive structure, fierce competition of initial product absolutely prevents sales 
extension of new product as if new product is provided for limited market so that the 
marginal consumer acquires no surplus. 
4.2 Necessity to analyze endogenous quality of new product 
Spulber(2012) suggests that the monopolist has a bigger incentive to innovate than 
that of an entrant under ex-post duopoly when the new product is sufficiently different 
from initial one (proposition 4). And Chen and Schwartz (2013) suggest that in a 
covered market the incentive to innovate under monopoly is larger than under ex-post 
duopoly when the quality of new product is higher than initial one. These both imply 
that it is under some conditions that monopoly could give rise to a larger incentive to 
innovate which then has a positive impact on innovation. Different from comparison 
between monopoly and ex-post duopoly, the results of comparison between 
monopolistic structure and competitive structure in this paper are more likely to lead 
to an embarrassing conclusion that a competitive firm has stronger incentive to 
innovate if the quality of new product is high. Combined with common sense that 
higher quality of product needs bigger investment, it could be deduced that if large 
investment is needed, a competitive firm compared with a monopolist is more like to 
innovate, which is reversed while it is easy to innovate new product with high quality 
without huge investment. Even though financial discrimination is eliminated ideally, it 
is difficult to comprehend the positive correlation between competition and big 
innovations with high investment, or, between market concentration and small 
innovation with low investment. 
But this conclusion will be explained from a perspective of endogenous 
innovation represented here by quality of new product. In fact, there exists an 
endogenous problem with respect to correlation between innovation and incremental 
revenue from it when taking into consideration that the provider of new product 
would choose an optimum value of quality by pondering over both revenue function 
and cost function. So observed innovation as a result of business decision depends not 
only on revenue it may bring about but also on the investment for it. 
4.3 Diversion effect and coordination effect 
By using the terms from Chen and Schwartz (2013), now we analyze the diversion 
effect and coordination effect under monopolistic structure compared to under 
competitive structure, which denote the differences between monopoly and ex-post 
duopoly by Chen and Schwartz. 
 
Figure 7. DE on initial product 
 
Figure 8. CE on new product 
Under monopoly in situation (c) and (d), i.e., when both products are sold in 
market without both being on the monopolistic price, the price of initial product is 
higher than monopolistic price which leads to less revenue from initial product 
compared with initial revenue before innovation. Appearance of new product erodes 
the initial profit from initial product, which is diversion effect (DE) of new product on 
initial product under monopoly. Since a competitive firm has zero initial profit, 
without DE it sometimes has stronger incentive to innovate for new product. We use 
RM0, R1M, R2M, and RC to denote respectively initial revenue, revenue from initial 
product after innovation and that from new product of a monopolist, and revenue from 
new product of initially competitive innovator here. The value of DE can be given by 
DE=RM0－R1M. Because of symmetry, under monopoly the initial product also has the 
diversion effect on new product which erodes the revenue from new product 
compared to potential revenue acquired when only new product is sold on a 
monopolistic price. Nevertheless, compared to competitive firms, a monopolist could 
set a proper price for initial product and manage to acquire higher profit from new 
product, which is coordination effect (CE) of initial product under monopoly on new 
product. In situation (c), (d), and (e), a competitive firm with new product, without 
CE, has to face fierce competition from initial product. The value of CE can be given 
by CE=R2M－RC. For a monopolist, compared to a competitive producer, DE hampers 
product innovation while CE promotes innovation. 
The difference of DI for product innovation between of a monopolist and of an 
initially competitive firm then can be given by DIM－DIC=(R1M+R2M－RM0)－RC. It is 
easy to get DIM－DIC=CE－DE (for similar equation, see Chen and Schwartz, 2013). 
The DI for product innovation under monopoly is larger if and only if the value of CE 
is bigger than of DE. And with computer we can calculate precise values of CE and 
DE, see figure 7 and figure 8. When potential new product is similar to initial one and 
possesses high quality, a monopolist has a lower DI for product innovation than an 
initially competitive firm does because of prominent DE which will erode initial profit. 
While if prospective new product is comparatively differentiated from initial one, a 
monopolist could have a higher DI for product innovation compared to a competitive 
firm partly because strong CE will provide enough incremental profit. 
4.4 Further discussion about impact of market structure on product innovation 
With respect to the rent for the information relating to product innovation, provided 
that a falls, generally, as time goes by, a competitive firm would, compared with a 
monopolist, pay a higher price when the prospective new product is similar with 
initial one, but a lower price for innovation about new product significantly 
differentiated from the initial one, since high a is encountered even though the 
information has been occupied by the firm.  
However, sometimes there exists new product without huge difficulty to be 
innovated with high quality and popularity among consumers, which often appears in 
some occasional cases where existing technology or natural resource is found capable 
to be utilized effectively in a way unknown before. For a much differentiated new 
product with low a, a competitive firm will also pay more for buying relative 
information, invest more on its application, and realize higher quality than a 
monopolist does. Even though having acquired the information, monopoly results in 
less investment on and lower quality of new product since high quality would erode 
more of the profit from initial one. Then with respect to a kind of typical horizontally 
differentiated new product, there is a description for a phenomenon that a monopolist, 
compared with competitive firms, would like to invest to handle some extraordinarily 
tough problems related to new product but is reluctant to apply some simple 
technologies efficiently to innovate new product with high quality, for which 
diversion effect is the reason. 
Therefore, for a kind of typical horizontally same or similar new product, a 
competitive firm often prevails in innovation race. A monopolist, however, would pay 
more than a competitive producer for a kind of typical horizontally different new 
product if original foundation work is needed to innovate it so that a is large. One 
exception to the disadvantage of monopoly is that existing technology which can be 
utilized easily brings about low complexity of innovation. It can also be easily 
explained by an extreme example that complexity coefficient is so sufficiently low 
that endogenous quality of new product is sufficiently high and capable to entirely 
substitute initial product on a monopolistic price, which leads to comparative 
unwillingness of a monopolist to innovate new product with high quality because of 
diversion effect.  
Variables l and u2 depend on and influence each other, so do variables l and a. 
High quality of new product leading to violent substitution on initial product also 
means comparatively low horizontal difference, or high horizontal similarity, between 
them. Then the exception above on the other side shows that competitive firms have 
advantages to innovate similar product. From this perspective, monopoly would be 
conductive to product innovation only when the potential new product is 
comparatively differentiated from initial one, which agrees with conclusion of Chen 
and Schwartz (2013). 
Since complexity of innovation is a dynamic variable, with some given horizontal 
differentiation of potential new product, monopoly may be favorable for product 
innovation at beginning but to disadvantage of it when the complexity coefficient is 
sufficiently small. So with respect to innovation the past reason for monopoly 
probably will no longer be reasonable in the future, especially when difficulty of 
innovation is eased exogenously. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Since monopoly would like to results in more investment on product innovation when 
innovation complexity is large but will be inferior to competition once improving 
quality of new product turns easy, then there appears a question whether an initially 
monopolistic enterprise should be demerged to promote subsequent upgrade of new 
product after the monopolist has done lots of work for innovation. Often, answer is 
prone to “yes” if game has been over yet, since monopoly also damage consumer 
surplus and social welfare. Nevertheless, demerger may hamper another product 
innovation from dynamic perspective, for example, in this model, on the other side of 
initial product’s position there may exist another potential new product. It is needed to 
consider and measure more factors when many innovative projects are conducted by a 
monopolist at the same time, which occurs sometimes. 
According to results of the model, monopolistic structure often leads to lower 
welfare than competitive structure. Without purpose to provoke goodness of 
monopoly, here we consider more factors. Financial constraints ignored in the model 
may change conclusion about innovation and social welfare. About impact of 
financial constraints, see Brown et al. (2011). Moreover, static welfare depreciates the 
value of innovation which yields a long-term welfare in a dynamic system. Besides 
exerting spill-over effect (see Caballero and Jaffe, 1993), R&D investment and 
research outputs accelerate the process of appearance of new products and application 
of new technology. From long-term perspective, technological progress composed of 
and derived from accumulated innovations can improve the social welfare in a 
nonlinear way, with which considered comparison of static welfare may not give a 
conclusive answer about merits of market structure. 
Here repeat some essential results in preceding parts. For product innovation, in a 
sufficiently large market monopoly is superior to competition only if the potential 
new product is comparatively horizontally differentiated from initial product and 
complexity of innovation is high. Static consumer surplus and social welfare under 
monopoly are often lower than that under competition. The perspective this paper 
analyzes innovation from is impact of market structure on revenue from innovation, 
and diversion effect and coordination effect are analyzed as factors influencing 
difference of innovation between two structures. Schumpeter effect and coordination 
effect are in the same direction when having impact on product innovation, while 
replacement effective, escape competition effect and diversion effect are in the same 
direction. When complexity of innovation is high, an innovator needs more R&D 
funds, impetus for innovation and enough power to occupy the benefits from 
innovation, Schumpeter effect is strong which endows monopoly advantage to 
promote innovation. However, for a competitive firm facing easy innovative 
conduction, constraints of capital and power to possess as much the benefits from 
innovation as possible are loose, which reinforces the role of escape competition 
effect and results in superiority of competition. So for horizontally differentiated new 
product, results in this paper can be explained partly by Schumpeter effect and escape 
competition effect. For horizontally similar new product, competition shows larger 
advantage than monopoly does because of significant diversion effect under 
monopoly, which can also be explained from the perspective of replacement effect or 
escape competition effect. 
For future research, comparison of innovation between incumbent and entrant 
could be analyzed. An entrant confronting an incumbent monopolist can innovate for 
new product and enter market then. So can an entrant encountering competitive 
incumbents. Conductions relating to innovation of an incumbent monopolist facing 
entrant, of an entrant facing the monopolist, and of an entrant facing competitive 
incumbents, and ranking order of relative results of them, are all interesting topics. 
What impact complexity of innovation has on relationship between innovation and 
market concentration also needs empirical research and further theory study. Conducts 
and performance in limited or entirely covered market are also good points to do more 
research about innovation. 
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Appended drawing 1. Comparison about CS 
with exogenously determined u2 
E means there are equivalent values under 
monopoly and competition. M means CS is 
higher under monopoly while C means under 
competition. 
 
Appended drawing 2. Comparison about W 
with exogenously determined u2 
E means there are equivalent values under 
monopoly and competition. M means W is 
higher under monopoly while C means under 
competition. 
 
 
Appended drawing 3. Segments corresponding to 
5 situations under monopoly with exogenous u2 
 
Appended drawing 4. Segments corresponding 
to 6 situations under competition with 
exogenous u2 
 
 Appended drawing 5. 
 
Appended drawing 6. 
 
 
Appended drawing 7. Segments corresponding 
to 5 situations under monopoly with 
endogenous u2 
 
Appended drawing 8. Segments corresponding 
to 6 situations under competition with 
endogenous u2 
 
 Appended drawing 9. Comparison of IDI 
E means there are equivalent values under 
monopoly and competition. M means IDI is 
higher under monopoly while C means under 
competition. N means no product innovation 
occurs. 
 
Appended drawing 10. Comparison of INI 
E means there are equivalent values under 
monopoly and competition. M means INI is 
higher under monopoly while C means under 
competition. N means no product innovation 
occurs. 
 
 
Appended drawing 11. Comparison about 
CS with endogenous u2 
E means there are equivalent values under 
monopoly and competition. M means CS is 
higher under monopoly while C means under 
competition. 
 
Appended drawing 12. Comparison about 
W with endogenous u2 
E means there are equivalent values under 
monopoly and competition. M means W is 
higher under monopoly while C means under 
competition. 
 
